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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aftermath of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 pervaded the 
globe so fast, plunging the global financial system almost into chaos.  Most 
economies, consequently, have experienced devastating panic due to 
following recessions and rising unemployment, though in different degrees.  
In response, governments around the world, rather competitively or in a 
coordinated way, have announced and launched massive fiscal stimulus 
packages as well as monetary easing with an aim to put their economies back 
on track.  Like other countries, Korea also aggressively implemented 
several fiscal stimulus packages after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  
This paper is purposed to examine whether these unusual expansionary 
fiscal policy measures contributed to the quick recovery from the GFC.  
However, few studies have assessed the effectiveness of fiscal policy during 
the GFC.  Furthermore, among the very few, most being model-based, agree 
that those bold fiscal policy measures have helped the Korean economy to 
return to normalcy.  Eskesen (2009) shows using the GIMF model (Global 
Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model) that the expansionary fiscal policy 
brought about additional economic growth of 1.0-1.5%p in Korea in 2009.  
Based on the simulation of a simultaneous equation model, S.-T. Kim (2012) 
also estimates that the growth rate enhancement effect of the expansionary 
fiscal policy was 0.3-0.5%p in 2008 and 1.1-1.9%p in 2009.
1)
  Such a 
model-based evaluation, however, tends to show what we believe rather than 
what we see in that transmission mechanism of fiscal policy is already fixed 
in the economic model.  Thus, this paper takes a purely empirical approach 
in order to examine how fiscal policy measures
2)
 implemented during the 
                                                          
1) There are recent studies that evaluate how much fiscal policy contributed to real GDP 
growth during the GFC in U.S. and Euro area.  Cogan et al. (2010) investigate the 
effectiveness of ARRA (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) following Smet and 
Wouter (2007) and show that additional real GDP growth attributable to ARRA is about 
0.6-0.7%p in 2009.  Coenen et al. (2012) extend the European Central Bank’s New Area-
Wide Model and estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased real GDP 
growth during the GFC by up to 1.6%p. 
2) Fiscal expansion is so exceptional from a long history of fiscal conservatism in Korea (Koh, 
2002). 
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GFC have helped the Korean economy achieve the faster-than-expected 
recovery. 
So far, on the efficacy of fiscal policies in Korea, several empirical 
literatures provide conflicting views.
3)
  Depending on estimation techniques 
and data sets used, they sustain or refute the effectiveness of fiscal policies 
work in Korea.  W. Kim (2006), adopting the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
framework, shows that both structural shock of tax cut and fiscal expenditure 
contribute to alleviating business fluctuations and claim that tax cut is a more 
effective counter-cyclical measure than fiscal expenditure.  In contrast, S.-S. 
Kim (2007) and Hur (2007) report that the efficacy of fiscal policy is not 
statistically significant.  Compared with W. Kim (2006), they modify 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) by adopting different sets of variables and 
identification strategies.  S.-S. Kim (2007) adds inflation and interest rate 
variables in the original setup of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  Hur (2007) 
supports the insignificant effectiveness of fiscal policy by levying a new 
shock identification strategy of “Expenditure-Within-Revenue”.  However, 
all the empirical literatures including the above do not focus on the GFC 
period.  
To our best knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to assess empirically 
the effectiveness of fiscal policies in Korea during the GFC.  In details, it 
employs the following three empirical strategies.  First, we directly regress 
real GDP and output gap
4)
 respectively on widely used indicators of fiscal 
stance.  The empirical results show that real GDP growth increases when 
the fiscal stance is expansionary, and vice versa. More importantly, the size 
of coefficient is larger when including the GFC periods, which implies the 
expansionary fiscal stance during the GFC was quite effective and pervasive 
for the Korean economy to rebound from the recession.  Similar results are 
found even when output gap is used instead of real GDP growth.  
Second, in order to assess the robustness of the above single equation 
approach, we construct bivariate VAR with FIS and real GDP growth (output 
                                                          
3) Refer to Hur (2007) and S.-T. Kim (2012) for Korean literature on these issues. 
4)
 For notational consistency, output gap is defined as follows: output gap = actual output – 
potential output. 
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gap) and identify structural shocks using Choleski-decomposition.  The 
impulse response analysis confirms that the fiscal stimulus package has 
helped the Korean economy to recover faster-than-expected.  
Third, this paper adopts an estimation strategy by Hur et al. (2010).  
Based on a country panel data set, they calculate a hypothetical growth path 
which would have been possible if it had not been for fiscal stimuli after the 
GFC.  Then, they compare it with the realized growth rate and run 
regressions in order to see how much the fiscal stimuli during the GFC 
explain the difference.  One of their major findings is that fiscal stimuli in 
Asian countries are significantly effective in boosting their economies after 
the crisis.  Hur et al. (2010) classify Korea as an Asian country and include 
it in the estimation.  Our paper varies from theirs by examining how the 
regression result changes by locating Korea in the category of non-Asian 
countries.  By doing so, we could provide evidence, though indirect, as to 
how effective the fiscal stimulus packages were in Korea after the GFC. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 compares fiscal positions 
before and after the GFC.  The size of fiscal stimulus packages announced 
by Korean government includes a portion contributed by the working of 
automatic stabilizer.  Identifying that the true fiscal stimulus packages are 
discretionary, we measure the size of fiscal stimulus packages by various 
methods and discuss whether the estimated size of fiscal stimulus packages is 
unprecedented.  Section 3 evaluates whether the fiscal stimulus packages 
were effective in boosting the Korean economy after the GFC.  Section 4 
summarizes major findings and discusses their implications. 
 
 
2. ASSESSMENT OF FISCAL POSITION:  
BEFORE AND AFTER THE GFC 
 
Like other Asian countries, Korean economy was distant from the center 
of the GFC.  Thus, the need for injection of liquidity into the economy was 
not imminent.  Instead usual combination of fiscal expansion and monetary 
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easing was executed in response to the crisis.
5)
  Since the purpose of this 
paper is to evaluate the efficacy of fiscal policy through the GFC, we 
hereafter focus on fiscal stimulus package.  Based on the consolidated 
government budget data, this section measures the timing and the magnitude 
of fiscal expansion after the GFC.  
 
2.1. Size and Composition of Fiscal Stimulus 
 
The size of fiscal stimulus package in 2008-2010 is estimated to be at 
about 59.8 trillion won (5.1% of GDP in 2010) according to the official 
report from the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF).  It combines 
spending expansions (30.5 trillion won) and tax cuts including tax 
exemptions and reductions (29.3 trillion won).  Table 1 exhibits 
chronologically major fiscal stimulus measures announced by the 
government since September 2008 in chronological order.  
These estimates of fiscal stimulus package in 2008-2010 are somewhat 
larger than those of Eskesen (2009), who claims that expenditure and revenue 
measures during the GFC in Korea would amount to 2.6% and 1.0% of GDP 
respectively in 2009.  Furthermore, Eskesen (2009) predicts that additional 
revenue measures would be taken in the volume of 1.2% per GDP.  Putting 
these figures altogether and converting the sum to a nominal value, it would 
amount to 48 trillion won, which is smaller than our own estimate of 59.8 
trillion won.  Such discrepancy could be attributed to the different timing of 
measurement and the different sources of data.  
On the other hand, in terms of composition, these two estimates indicate 
unanimously that the fiscal stimulus package is concentrated more on 
specific areas, such as tax cut, SOC building and supports for SMEs and the 
self-employed.
6)
  These budget items are known to have bigger or more 
persistent multiplier effects according to the existing literature.  S.-S. Kim 
(1997) reports that the government investment tends to boost private economic 
                                                          
5) Park et al. (2011) assess that massive and responsive monetary easing and expansionary 
fiscal policy contributed to the quick recovery of emerging Asian economies from the GFC. 
6) For details, compare table 1 with Eskesen (2009). 
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Table1 Major Fiscal Stimulus Measures after the GFC 
Major Fiscal Stimulus Measures Amount (tril. won) 
Supplementary Budget of 2008 (September 2008) 4.6 
∙ Spending on infrastructure of the local government 1.0 
∙ Support for stabilization of utility bills 1.3 
∙ Support for farmers, fishermen and small- and mid-sized 
merchants 
0.6 
∙ Mandatory expenditures 0.7 
∙ Investment in resource development funds and others 1.0 
Tax Reform of 2008 (December 2008) –29.6 
∙ Tax cut in 2008~2010 –29.6 
Revised Budget of 2009 (December 2008) 10.7 
∙ Support for local SMEs, small business owners, farmers 
and fishermen 
3.4 
∙ Increase of Social Overhead Capital (SOC) projects 4.6 
∙ Support for welfare of low-income earners 1.0 
∙ Measures to address youth unemployment 0.3 
∙ Financial support for local government and others 1.4 
Supplementary Budget of 2009 (April 2009) 28.4 
∙ Support for welfare of low-income earners 4.2 
∙ Job retention and creation 3.5 
∙ Support for small size companies, exporters, and the self-
employed 
4.5 
∙ Investment in research and development 2.3 
∙ Spending on local government and others 2.7 
∙ Coverage of loss on revenues 11.2 
Tax Reform of 2009 (December 2009) 8.3 
∙ Revenue increase from the termination of tax exemption 
and reduction in 2010 
8.3 
Sources: (1) MOSF, Various Press Releases.  (2) MOSF (Nov. 2008), Comprehensive Policy 
Measures to Overcome the Ongoing Economic Difficulties, Monthly Economic 
Bulletin.  (3) Cho and Kim (2011). 
 
activities whereas the government consumption is likely to crowd out them.  
Also, W. Kim (2006) and Hur (2007) claim that tax cut tends to have more 
Fiscal Policies of Korea through the Global Financial Crisis 401 
persistent and boosting effect than spending increase.  Summing up, it is 
inferred that tax benefits and subsidies on corporate investments and on the 
purchase of durable goods are likely to have persistent and positive effects on 
an economy.  Therefore, the composition of fiscal stimulus package of 
Korea is considered appropriate for boosting the economy. 
 
2.2. Size of “Discretionary” Fiscal Stimulus 
 
Fiscal policy could influence the dynamics of an economy through 
automatic stabilizer as well as a discretionary measure.  Thus, we need to 
remove a portion contributed by automatic stabilizer from that by 
discretionary policy.  Though conceptually clear, it is quite intriguing to 
decompose changes in fiscal variables into the two parts empirically.  Thus, 
here we use the following two approaches.  
The first one is to observe Fiscal Impulse (FI) and FIS (Fiscal Stance) 
indicators, which are commonly used as proxies for “discretionary” fiscal 
policies.  These measures, widely used for its simplicity, are calculated by 
the IMF method (refer to Heller et al., 1986 and Lee, 2006).  To begin with, 
find a reference point of time, at which real GDP is closest to potential GDP 
or GDP gap is almost zero.  At the point of time, the ratios of government 
revenue to GDP and expenditure to GDP are denoted as 0 0 0/t T y  and 
0 0 0/g G y  respectively.  Then, we define the cyclically neutral balance 
by 
*
0 0 ,nB t y g y   where y  is a real GDP and 
*y  is potential GDP.  
Such a definition of the cyclically neutral balance is based on a notion that 
fiscal stance neither expansionary nor contractionary when revenue grows at 
the speed of real GDP while expenditure at the speed of potential GDP.  
Thus, by taking the difference between the cyclically neutral balance ( )nB  
and the current fiscal balance ( ),B  we obtain a measure of fiscal stance 
called FIS in abbreviation. 
 
.nFIS B B   
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Notably, FIS compares the current fiscal stance with that of the reference 
point.  Thus, the negative (positive) sign of FIS implies that the current 
fiscal stance is contractionary (expansionary) compared with the reference 
point of time 0.  
In different occasions, however, it would be more useful to hold a measure 
comparing the current fiscal stance with that of the previous period.  For the 
purpose, Fiscal Impulse (FI) indicator is devised to be change in the ratio of 
FIS to potential GDP.  Of course, the sign of FI is interpreted in a similar 
way to that of FIS but it indicates the change of fiscal stance from the 
previous period.  
 
*( / ).FI FIS y   
 
Using the Korean data, we calculate FIS and FI, and compare them with 
the deviation of real GDP from the long-run trend as shown in figure 1.  The 
potential GDP used here is seasonally adjusted and HP-filtered.  The figure 
1 is drawn with the consolidated fiscal data since 2000.
7)
  It shows that FIS 
and especially FI increased sharply during the first half of 2009 in response 
to the negative real GDP deviation following the GFC.  Such an aggressive 
fiscal reaction had not been observed before then.  Of course, even before 
the GFC, it is known that fiscal policy of Korea responds (slightly) in a 
counter-cyclical way.
8)
  In terms of both magnitude and responsiveness, 
however, the fiscal stimulus package executed after the GFC is somewhat 
unprecedented in the fiscal history of Korea with an exception of the 1997 
currency crisis.
9)  These above two measures of fiscal stance unanimously 
                                                          
7) We consider the sample period after the Asian Financial Crisis to reflect the possibility of a 
structural change in Korean economy. 
8) For example, Lee (2006) measures how responsive the Korean fiscal framework to a 
business cycle.  He, using a longer series of the central budget data (the fiscal data 
available in Monthly Statistical Bulletin published by Bank of Korea), calculates FI and FIS, 
regresses them on the past GDP gaps, and reports that overall fiscal policy, especially 
expenditure side, properly responded to economic conditions.  On the other hand, based on 
the observations that average FIs do not show the significant difference between 
expansionary and recessionary periods, he doubts whether the fiscal policy timing has been 
proper. 
9) In the 1997 currency crisis, financial institutions including several major domestic banks 
Fiscal Policies of Korea through the Global Financial Crisis 403 
Figure 1 Fiscal Stance (FIS), Fiscal Impulse (FI),  
and Real GDP Deviation 
 
Notes: 1) Authors’ own calculation.  2) ln(rGDP_det)=ln(real GDP)-ln(real GDP*).  3) Real 
GDP* is seasonally adjusted and HP-filtered. 
 
confirm that fiscal stimulus package of Korea is concentrated in the first half 
of 2009.  The actual fiscal execution rate also supports the findings from FI 
and FIS.  The fiscal execution rate was 62.8% in the first half of 2009, 
which is about 8%p greater than in normal period.  The reason that it is so 
high despite of a supplementary budget in April, 2009, is because of the 
front-loading of budget of 2009.  
Next, we check the reliability of FI and FIS by comparing them with 
another measure for discretionary fiscal policy.  For the purpose, a three-
variable Structural VAR (SVAR) is estimated in order to extract orthogonal 
shocks, which, in turn, are identified to be discretionary portions.  
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), adopted are three shock 
identification strategies,
10)
 especially the last of which is based on the 
                                                                                                                             
were directly hit and most of fiscal resources flew into the restructuring or the resolution 
process of those distressed ones.  In contrast, this time was different and most of fiscal 
stimulus package was allocated to sustain domestic demand. 
10) For the details on other identification strategies mentioned briefly here, refer to Hur (2007). 
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institutional information of Korea.  
The three key variables are real GDP ( ),tY  government expenditure 
( ),tG  and tax revenue ( ).tT   All of them which are seasonally adjusted are 
the log-value after being divided by population size and detrended by HP-
filter.  A reason for detrending all the variables is because we would like to 
focus on business cycles rather than long-term non-stationary movements.  
Then, a SVAR system of tX  is represented as: 
 
1( ) ,   ,    .
t t
t t t t t t t
t t
T t
X A L X U X G U g
Y y

   
   
      
   
   
 
 
The above SVAR system is not complete in that detailed assumptions on 
the disturbance term tU  are needed for further specifications.  
The first identification strategy is simple Cholesky Decomposition, which 
restricts tU  in the following way. 
 
1
1 2
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 .
0 0 0 1
t
t t t
g
t t t
y
t t t
t t e
g g b e
y y c c e
       
       
         
       
       
 
 
Second, as a typical example of institutional identification strategies, we 
adopt Blanchard and Perotti (2002), whose shock identification is represented 
as  
 
3 2
3 1
1 2
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 .
0 0 0 1
t
t t t
g
t t t
y
t t t
t t a e
g g b e
y y e


 
       
       
         
       
       
 
 
The third identification strategy borrows the restrictions on 1  and 
3( 0)   from the budget data in addition to 3 ,  based on common 
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perception that the government of Korea has kept the principle of 
“Expenditure within Revenue” since 1980s (Koh, 2002).11)  Due to the long 
tradition of fiscal consolidation or maintaining the balanced budget, the level 
of expenditure still tends to be determined within the revenue forecasts.  
Exploiting such a tendency of fiscal conservatism, we assign a restriction on 
1  by running a regression of expenditure increment on tax revenue 
increase.  Compared with the other identification strategies, this highlights 
the contemporaneous relation in the disturbance term .tU  
 
2 3
1 3
1 2
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 .
0 0 0 1
t
t t t
g
t t t
y
t t t
t t e
g g e
y y e
 
 
 
       
       
         
       
       
 
 
Based on the estimates from the above SVARs,
12)
 we calculate orthogonal 
shocks in tax revenue and expenditure and define them to be the third 
measures for discretionary fiscal policies.  Table 2 reports how they are 
correlated with FI and FIS. 
The upper part of table 2 shows that, regardless of identification strategies, 
FIS and FI tend to have positive correlation with contemporaneous 
discretionary expenditure change ( )gte  and negative correlation with 
contemporaneous discretionary revenue change ( ).tte   Especially, the 
correlations are statistically significant between FI and discretionary 
expenditure measures.  Furthermore, in the lower part of table 2, which 
identifies the discretionary fiscal stimulus to be ,g tt t te e e   the 
correlations of te  with 
g
te  and 
t
te  become greater and more significant.  
According to the correlation patterns in table 2, there is not much difference 
among orthogonal shocks derived from the three identification strategies.  
                                                          
11) [Quoted from Koh (2002)] “One important principle in fiscal management was established 
in this period.  It was the principle of “Expenditure within Revenue,” or the balanced 
budget principle.  While not formalized in a law or a regulation, it acted as self-discipline 
imposed on the budget authorities against imprudent management of the budget”. 
12) This study uses the consolidated budget data instead of the fiscal data from BOK’s Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin.  In this regard, this paper is differentiated from Hur (2007). 
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Table 2 Correlations among the Measures of  
Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus 
 
Identification Strategy I Identification Strategy II 
Identification Strategy  
III (#) 
Discret. Tax Discret. Exp Discret. Tax Discret. Exp Discret. Tax Discret. Exp 
FIS –0.25 0.32+ –0.27 0.30 –0.25 0.30 
FI –0.08 0.43** –0.11 0.42*** –0.08 0.42*** 
  
Discretionary 
 Fiscal Stimulus 
Identification  
Strategy I 
Identification  
Strategy II 
Identification  
Strategy III (#) 
FIS 0.35+ 0.33+ 0.36
***
 
FI 0.45
**
 0.44
**
 0.45
**
 
Notes: 1) *, **, *** and + is significant at the levels of 5%, 10%, 15% and lower than 1% 
respectively.  2) Identification Strategy 3(#) assumes the fiscal stance of 
“Expenditure within Revenue.” 
 
Summing up the results so far, we could recognize, regardless of 
measurement tools chosen, that fiscal stimulus package executed during the 
GFC is quite substantial and unusual.  Especially it is worth to note that this 
stimulus package is so exceptional, when considering the long tradition of 
fiscal conservatism in Korea.  
 
 
3. EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL STIMULUS PACKAGES IN 
COMBATING AGAINST THE GFC 
 
During a period between 2008 Q3 and 2010 Q4, some components of the 
national income contributed more to economic growth than the rest in the 
sequence of net export, consumption, and investment.  Right after the GFC, 
rapidly depreciating Korean won improved trade balance dramatically.  In 
the meantime, substantial investment from the government sector 
counteracted fallen private consumption and investment. 
Fiscal Policies of Korea through the Global Financial Crisis 407 
Figure 2 Growth Contribution and Rates by Components 
(a) Growth Contributions 
 
(b) Growth Rates  
Source: Bank of Korea.  
 
Since 2009 Q4, domestic consumption and investment, succeeding the net 
export, led the economic recovery of Korea.  This may be a sign of lagged 
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boosting effect from the fiscal stimulus package, considering that most of 
fiscal stimulus package were concentrated before 2009 Q4.  
Aforementioned, the main purpose of the paper is not to assess the overall 
efficacy of fiscal policies in Korea for the last two to three decades.  Instead, 
it aims to verify whether expansionary fiscal stance during the GFC have 
contributed to lift the Korean economy out of this one-time crisis.  However, 
it is not a simple task to devise a direct empirical strategy for this issue.  As 
alternatives, the paper adopts the following three approaches.  
First, using FIS calculated above, we investigate how FIS affected the 
dynamics of real GDP growth and output gap, respectively.  Thus, real GDP 
growth and output gap are respectively regressed by FIS and their lagged 
variables.  For empirical investigation, we use a quarterly sample covering 
2000 Q1 to 2010 Q4.  Since our goal is to evaluate the efficacy of 
expansionary fiscal policy during the GFC, we compare how the size of 
coefficient of FIS is different according to whether or not the GFC period is 
included.  As reported in table 3, real GDP growth positively responds to 
current period FIS even excluding the GFC periods.  In other words, real 
GDP growth increases when the fiscal stance is expansionary, and vice versa.  
One thing that should be noted is that the size of coefficient is lager when 
including the GFC periods, which implies the expansionary fiscal stance 
during the GFC was quite effective for the Korean economy to rebound from 
the recession.  This finding can be explained by timing and size of fiscal 
stimulus package.  The government quickly switched fiscal stance right 
after the GFC by implementing supplementary budget, revising budget for 
2009, and reforming tax system.  Especially, tax reform in 2008 was an 
anticipated action for the Korean economy to rebound, though it was not 
intended.  As a result, the government could allocate massive fiscal stimulus 
expenditure in the end of 2008 and the first half of 2009.  The size of the 
package was also historically unprecedented.  Its size measured in section 2 
was about 5.1% of GDP (59.8 trillion won) greater than any other countries.  
According IMF’s measure of the size of stimulus package in G-20 countries 
in table 5, it is confirmed that stimulus package of Korea was the largest 
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Table 3 Regression Results from GDP Growth 
Dependent 
Variable:      
GDP Growth 
2000.1/4-2010.4/4 
 (Including the GFC Period) 
2000.1/4-2008.2/4 
 (Excluding the GFC Period) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
  0.010
***     
(0.002) 
  0.006
***
    
(0.002) 
  0.007
***
    
(0.002) 
  0.011
***
 
     
(0.001) 
  0.008
***
    
(0.002) 
  0.008
***
    
(0.002) 
FIS 
0.863
**       
(0.366) 
 0.870
**     
(0.347) 
 0.838
***     
(0.206) 
 0.361
***       
(0.185) 
 0.412
**     
(0.187) 
 0.429
**     
(0.173) 
FIS(–1) 
–0.785 
(0.206) 
 –0.972***  
(0.226) 
 –0.743**  
(0.302) 
–0.554 
(0.183) 
 –0.639***  
(0.187) 
 –0.736***  
(0.216) 
FIS(–2) 
  
–0.274      
(0.240)   
0.132      
(0.179) 
GDP Growth(–1) 
 
  0.318
*** 
(0.110) 
0.235  
 
(0.153)  
  0.231
*** 
(0.111) 
0.284
*
 
 
(0.165) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.289 0.365 0.370 0.244 0.282 0.270 
Notes: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses.  2) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author estimates. 
 
Table 4 Regression Results from Output Gap 
Dependent 
Variable 
2000.1/4-2010.4/4  
(Including the GFC Period) 
2000.1/4-2008.2/4 
(Excluding the GFC Period) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
–0.002     
(0.001) 
–0.001    
(0.001) 
–0.001    
(0.001) 
–0.002     
(0.002) 
–0.001    
(0.001) 
–0.001    
(0.001) 
FIS 
  1.233
***       
(0.131) 
  1.165
***     
(0.106) 
  1.146
***     
(0.103) 
  1.036
***       
(0.133) 
  0.878
***     
(0.101) 
  0.879
***     
(0.103) 
FIS(–1) 
–0.148 
(0.151) 
 –0.928***  
(0.152) 
 –0.773***  
(0.172) 
–0.389 
(0.151) 
 –0.948***  
(0.113) 
 –0.931***  
(0.144) 
FIS(–2)   
–0.192*      
(0.108)   
–0.021      
(0.105) 
Output Gap(–1)  
  0.757
*** 
(0.102) 
  0.728
***
  
 
(0.101)  
 0.854
*** 
(0.091) 
  0.846
***
  
 
(0.101) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.652 0.858 0.866 0.454 0.857 0.864 
Notes: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses.  2) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Author estimates. 
 
following Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
13)
  
                                                          
13) The discrepancy between our estimate and IMF’s is attributable to the difficulty in clearly 
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Table 5 The Size of Expansionary Fiscal Policy Implemented  
by the G-20 Members  
(unit: % of GDP) 
 
2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 0.0 1.5 0.0 
Australia  1.2 2.5 2.1 
Brazil 0.0 0.6 0.5 
Canada 0.0 1.9 1.7 
China 0.4 3.1 2.7 
France 0.0 0.7 0.8 
Germany 0.0 1.6 2.0 
India 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Indonesia 0.0 1.0 0.6 
Italy 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Japan 0.3 2.4 1.8 
Korea 1.1 3.7 1.2 
Mexico 0.0 1.5 0.0 
Russia 0.0 4.1 1.3 
Saudi Arabia 2.4 3.3 3.5 
South Africa 2.3 3.0 2.1 
Spain 1.9 2.3 0.0 
Turkey 0.0 0.8 0.3 
Britain 0.2 1.5 0.0 
The U.S. 1.1 2.0 1.8 
G-20 Members 0.6 2.0 1.5 
Source: IMF (2009b). 
 
Similar results are found when output gap is used instead of GDP 
growth.
14)
  The greater coefficient of FIS is obtained when the GFC period 
is included.  This supports that the stimulus package during the GFC was 
quite effective compared with any other previous experiences of fiscal 
expansion. 
                                                                                                                             
differentiating between automatic stabilizer and discretionary spending.  In addition, size 
of each country’s fiscal stimulus package defies an accurate estimation for various reasons.  
The execution period of the fiscal stimulus package varied from a country to another and in 
some cases the budget amount formulated before the crisis or the funds injected into the 
financial sector were included.  Nevertheless, the growth of government budget 
(estimated by the IMF) is based on the consistent standards and reflects each country’s 
fiscal spending trends to an extent. 
14) Output gap here is measured by Blanchard and Quah (1989).  The empirical results are 
qualitatively similar even when output gap is measured by HP filtering. 
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Second, in order to assess the robustness of the above findings, we 
construct bivariate VAR with FIS and real GDP growth (output gap) and 
identify structural shocks using Choleski-decomposition.  Figure 3 describes 
 
Figure 3 Impulse Response Analysis 
(a) Response of Real GDP Growth to Fiscal Shock 
        Including the GFC Period 
       2000.1-2010.4 
       Excluding the GFC Period 
      2000.1-2008.2 
  
(b) Response of Output Gap to Fiscal Shock 
     Including the GFC Period 
    2000.1-2010.4 
      Excluding the GFC Period 
    2000.1-2008.2 
  
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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the main results from the bivariate VAR in forms of impulse responses.  
The results consistently confirm the positive responses of the real GDP 
growth and the output gap to unexpected change in the fiscal stance.  
Furthermore, these patterns are intensified when the GFC period is included 
in the sample, indicating that the expansionary fiscal policies have helped the 
Korean economy to recover from the downward pressure earlier than 
expected during the GFC.  
On the other hand, it should be noted that anticipated and unanticipated 
changes in fiscal policy are not distinguished in our VAR setup. As 
highlighted at the recent debate between Gali et al. (2007) and Ramey 
(2011),
15)
 a VAR approach is based on the implemented fiscal records and 
ignores that fiscal shocks are usually anticipated prior to actual 
implementation in forms of government announcements or media reports on 
the fiscal procedures.
16)
  Such announcement effects may influence our 
empirical results.  However, we reason that this effect is quite marginal 
during the GFC on the following grounds.  First, the time interval between 
announcement and implementation stages during the GFC period is much 
shorter than Ramey (2011)’s estimate for the US economy (3-7 quarters).  
Second, most of budgetary expansions during the GFC are centered around a 
short period between 2008 3Q and 2009 2Q.  
Third, we employ the methodology of Hur, Jha, Park, and Qusing (2010).  
Hur et al. (2010) design an empirical framework to evaluate the effectiveness 
of countercyclical fiscal policy in Asian countries during the GFC.  The 
empirical framework consists of two stages.  The first stage is to estimate a 
Panel Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR) model using historical data up to 
2008 Q3 and to generate dynamic GDP forecasts of each sample country 
                                                          
15) We thank an anonymous referee for bring up this issue. 
16) Gali et al. (2007) show the effectiveness of fiscal policy by replicating Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) and Fatas and Mihov (2001), and provide New Keynesian Model allowing 
the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers with sticky prices to account for the positive 
effects of government spending.  While, Ramey (2011) argue that a standard VAR ignores 
the timing of the fiscal news.  Comparing results from the standard VAR and the narrative 
approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Ramey reasons that a key difference lies in the 
identification of timing. 
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during the global crisis from 2008 Q4 to 2009 Q2.  The choice of 2008 Q3 
as the breakpoint coincides with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 which triggered the global financial crisis. 
The second stage involves a cross-country regression with the gap between 
actual GDP and forecasted GDP on a number of explanatory variables.  The 
gap is to measure how much the real GDP would deviate from the actual 
value if there had not been a fiscal stimulus package.  Among the various 
explanatory variables, of particular interest are the interaction terms between 
fiscal variables and dummy for developing Asia that capture impact of fiscal 
policy for the developing Asian countries. 
In this paper, we give variations to Hur et al. (2010) on the following two 
points.  First, the data set is extended to 2009 Q4.  With the extended data 
set, we expect the contributions of fiscal stimulus packages to be evaluated at 
full-length.  Second, the second stage cross-country regressions are 
estimated separately by classifying Korea in different country groups.  
Table 6 reports the results of cross-country regressions on the gap between 
actual output and dynamic output forecasts for the crisis period generated by 
4-variable PVAR models.
17)
  Here Korea is treated as an Asian country in 
equation (1)-(3) while as a non-Asian country in equation (4)-(6).  
For both cases, the fiscal policies in developing Asia countries are likely to 
be more effective than the rest of the world as was confirmed in Hur et al. 
(2010).  More interestingly, when Korea is treated as non-Asia country, the 
magnitude and significance of interaction term between fiscal policy and 
Asia dummy become much weaker.  This result, consistent with those of 
table 3 and table 4, implies Korea’s fiscal stimulus package was quite 
effective and had an important role for Korea’s rapid recovery.  Overall, 
these empirical results provide limited support to the claim that 
countercyclical fiscal policy boosted aggregate demand and output in Korea 
at least during the GFC. 
 
                                                          
17) The four variables include the GDP, the tax revenue and the government expenditure of 
Korea and the global GDP. 
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Table 6 Regression Results From De-Trended 
4-Variable PVAR (-2009 Q3) 
 
Korea in Asian Group Korea in Non-Asian Group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
det*
1ln itGDP   
 0.437*** 0.418*** 0.444*** 0.467*** 0.451*** 0.478*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
detln _ itglobal GDP  
–0.005* –0.005* –0.004* –0.004 –0.005* –0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
det*
1ln itREV   
0.032 0.033 0.031 –0.003 0.015 0.014 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
det*
1ln itEXP   
–0.122** –0.122** –0.122** –0.079 –0.098* –0.099* 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
1_1
diff
itTS yr   
–0.580  –0.550 –0.577  –0.632 
(0.36)  (0.38) (0.38)  (0.39) 
1_3
diff
itTS yr   
 –0.495   –0.564  
 (0.38)   (0.38)  
1
diff
itPOLICY   
–0.890* –0.898* –0.908* –0.951** –1.033** –1.045** 
(0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) 
det*
1ln itREER   
0.039 0.025 0.038 0.030 0.030 0.044 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
det
1*lni itASIA REV   
–0.127** –0.131* –0.119* –0.080 –0.108 –0.097 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
det
1*lni itASIA EXP   
0.157** 0.170** 0.168** 0.126* 0.139* 0.139* 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
det
, 1 1*lni t itopen REV   
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.004 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
det
, 1 1*lni t itopen EXP   
–0.003 –0.003 –0.003 –0.002 –0.003 –0.002 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
det
1*lni itFS REV   
 –0.135 –0.214  –0.739 –0.769 
 (0.53) (0.54)  (0.49) (0.49) 
det
1*lni itFS EXP   
 –0.405 –0.385  0.350 0.367 
 (0.58) (0.58)  (0.56) (0.56) 
Constant 
–0.02** –0.02* –0.02** –0.026** –0.023* –0.024** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.421 0.426 0.429 0.392 0.412 0.416 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in parentheses.  2) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, 10%, respectively. 
Fiscal Policies of Korea through the Global Financial Crisis 415 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Like other economies in the world, Korean economy has suffered from the 
tremor of the GFC. In response to a severe recession following the GFC, 
Korea government executed unprecedented fiscal stimulus package along 
with monetary easing.  This study evaluates the efficacy of expansionary 
fiscal policies taken in Korea during the recent GFC.  For this purpose, we 
first estimate the size of the fiscal stimulus package based on the official 
report from MOSF.  The aggregate size of expansionary fiscal policy is 
estimated at about 59.8 trillion won (30.5 trillion won in spending and 29.3 
trillion won of tax cut), which accounts for 5.1% of GDP in 2010.  Its size 
was not only historically unprecedented, but also quite greater than any other 
countries.  According to IMF’s estimates for the fiscal stimulus packages in 
G-20 countries, it is confirmed that the stimulus package of Korea was the 
largest following Saudi Arabia and South Africa.  
For the evaluation of the efficacy of the stimulus package during the GFC, 
we first regress real GDP and output gap respectively on FIS and its lagged 
values.  The empirical results show that real GDP growth (the output gap) 
increases when the fiscal stance is expansionary, and vice versa. More 
importantly, the size of coefficient is larger when including the GFC periods, 
which implies the expansionary fiscal stance during the GFC was quite 
effective in inducing the Korean economy to rebound from the recession. 
Similar results are obtained also from a bivariate VAR analysis. 
Other supportive evidence is found from cross-country regressions 
following Hur et al. (2010).  Depending on which group Korea is assigned 
to Asian or non-Asian country group, the magnitude and significance of 
interaction term between fiscal policy and Asia dummy differ.  Especially, 
those estimates become much smaller when Korea is treated as non-Asia 
country.  Though indirectly, these empirical findings unanimously support 
that Korea’s fiscal stimulus package was quite effective and had an important 
role for Korea’s rapid recovery from the GFC. 
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